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Abstract 
Direct military rule has become rare in world politics. Today, most military regimes have 
either given way to some form of democracy or been transformed into another form of 
authoritarianism. This article formulates an analytical framework for the detachment of 
militaries from politics and identifies positive and negative factors for a withdrawal. It then 
applies this framework to the case of Burma/Myanmar, which is an example of deeply 
entrenched military rule. It is argued that the retreat from direct rule has brought with it a 
further institutionalization of military rule in politics, since the military was able to 
safeguard its interests and design the new electoral authoritarian regime according to its 
own purposes. The article identifies the internal dynamics within the military regime as a 
prime motive for a reform of the military regime. Although the external environment has 
completely changed over the last two decades, this had only a minor impact on military 
politics. The opposition could not profit from the regime’s factionalization and external 
sanctions and pressure have been undermined by Asian engagement. 
 
 
Keywords: military regime, civilian control, external influences, internal influences, 
competitive authoritarianism, Burma/Myanmar 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Marco Bünte 
is is a political scientist and a senior researcher at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies. His 
most recent publication is The Crisis of Democracy in Southeast Asia, Palgrave: Houndsmills, 
Basingstoke 2011 (with Aurel Croissant). 
Contact: <buente@giga-hamburg.de> 
Website: <http://staff.en.giga-hamburg.de/buente> 
Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy”:  
Abdication or Institutionalization of Military Rule? 
Marco Bünte 
Article Outline  
1 Introduction 
2  Military Regimes and Military Intervention in Politics 
3  Conducive and Unfavourable Conditions for Military Withdrawal 
4  The Military in Burmese Politics 1948–2010 
5  From Direct Rule to Military Control: Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy” 
6  Endogenous and Exogenous Factors in the Military’s Withdrawal (1988–2011) 
7  Summary and Conclusion 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Direct military rule has become rare in world politics. In March 2011 the Burmese military 
regime dissolved the ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), and 
handed over power to a newly elected civilian government. Due to these circumstances, 
Burma can no longer be classified as a case of direct military rule. This process illustrates a 
gradual decline of military regimes worldwide in the last two decades. This phenomenon 
has been especially virulent in Asia, where in 1987 half of the continent’s countries still lived 
under military or military-backed rule. Since then, democracy has replaced many military or 
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quasi-military regimes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand and Pakistan.1 This, 
however, is by no means a linear process, as the military coups in Pakistan 1999 and in Thai-
land 2006 demonstrated. Moreover, recent studies have also shown that in many newly de-
mocratized nations the military enjoys considerable political prerogatives and a great deal of 
institutional autonomy (Alagappa 2001; Beeson/Bellamy 2006; Croissant et al. 2011a). Why do 
militaries withdraw from power? How can we assess the military’s role in a “civilian state”? 
Does the military still wield power behind the scenes, making direct rule unnecessary?  
This paper adds to the literature on civil military relations in several ways: First, it con-
structs a concept of military participation in politics that goes beyond the recent emphasis on 
coup politics. Traditionally, the detachment of military from politics and the establishment of 
civilian control has been defined as the lack of military coups and military rule (Nordlinger 
1977). In contrast to this dichotomous perspective, I use a gradual concept of military involve-
ment whose polar opposites are civilian supremacy/civilian control on one side and military 
control/military rule on the other. Second, I construct a framework that discusses various pos-
itive and negative factors for a detachment of the military from politics. This framework suc-
ceeds in overcoming the traditional limitations of the dominance of either internal or external 
factors found in the literature on civil–military relations. Third, this paper brings attention to 
the outlier Burma/Myanmar,2 which is an example of extreme persistence of military rule 
and thus contradicts the overall diagnosis of extreme instability of military regimes found in 
the general literature on authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999; Hadenius/Teorell 2007).  
Burma is generally regarded as the most durable military regime worldwide. Soon after 
independence from Great Britain in 1948, the military became the most powerful institution 
in the country with a huge impact on society and the economy. Confronted with a number of 
countrywide insurgencies after the departure of the British, the military initiated a rapid 
modernization of the armed forces that by far overtook the institutional development of the 
Burmese state. The consequence was a “military aggrandizement of resources, responsibili-
ties and powers in traditional non-military realms” (Callahan 2003: 18).  
After General Ne Win’s coup against the civilian government of U Nu in 1962, the coun-
try has oscillated between direct and indirect forms of military rule. General Ne Win and his 
                                                 
1  Quasi-military regimes are military regimes with a civilian façade (such as a constitution, civilian president, 
semi-competitive elections). These regimes, however, are military in substance, since the military holds a po-
litical hegemony (Finer 1962).  
2  The military regime changed the name of the country in July 1989 from Burma to Myanmar. At the same time, 
a number of other titles and places were changed in an attempt to remove any traces of the colonial era. In the 
subsequent years, the new name was accepted by the UN and other states and institutions. A number of coun-
tries and pro-democracy groups have, however, refused to acknowledge the new name as a protest against the 
human rights abuses of the military and its refusal to hand over power to an elected civilian government. 
Throughout this paper, “Burma” is employed in preference to “Myanmar”, though this is highly contested 
terrain. The name “Burma” is less obviously associated with the dominant ethnic group. For more on these is-
sues see Dittmer (2008).  
6 Marco Bünte: Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy” 
Revolutionary Council ruled Burma directly until 1974, when the country was transformed 
into a military-backed, socialist one-party state under the leadership of Ne Win’s Burmese 
Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). The “Burmese Way to Socialism”, however, led to a se-
vere economic crisis at the end of the 1980s. Confronted with massive pro-democracy 
demonstrations in the wake of the economic crisis, Ne Win decided to resign in July 1988. 
The military, however, managed to reconsolidate its power, after it cracked down on pro-de-
mocracy demonstrations in August 1988, killing several thousand protestors. The coup by the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) on 18 August 1988 re-established direct 
military rule, which continued for over 21 years until 30 March 2011, when the military dis-
solved the ruling body, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, the SLORC’s suc-
cessor), and handed over power to the newly elected President Thein Sein.  
Military rule in Burma has been especially contested over the last two decades: After the 
military promised to hand over power to an elected government in 1988, it did not 
acknowledge the results of the elections in May 1990, which ended in a landslide victory for 
the oppositional National League for Democracy (NLD). Acting in the manner of a caretaker 
government, the military argued that the country lacked a constitution for transferring pow-
er to a new government. What followed was a decade of confrontations – on one side be-
tween the military, the NLD and the ethnic groups, and on the other side between the mili-
tary and the Western countries, which supported the opposition’s call for an acknowledg-
ment of the results of the 1990s elections. Finally, in September 2003, the military announced 
its roadmap to “disciplined democracy”, which promised to transfer power to an elected 
government again. After the military managed to write a new constitution and to hold multi-
party elections, in which the playing field was heavily tilted toward the military-dominated 
party, it handed over power to the new civilian government in March 2011.  
In the following section, I give a definition of military regimes and discuss the various 
ways militaries can be involved in politics. I then go on to formulate a framework for dis-
cussing various preconditions and reasons for militaries to disengage from politics. Then I 
elucidate the evolution and state of military involvement in politics in Burma from 1948 till 
2011 and discuss reasons for the military’s withdrawal from direct rule. In the last section, I 
offer some conclusions based on the case of Burma. 
2 Military Regimes and Military Intervention in Politics 
Military regimes, which can be defined as a “system of government by the military” (Perlmut-
ter 1980: 96), are a special form of authoritarian rule. As such, they have to be distinguished 
from both democracies and other forms of authoritarian rule. Following Dahl’s concept of pol-
yarchy, scholars have adopted a “procedural minimum” definition of democracy that includes 
four key attributes: free, fair and competitive elections, full adult suffrage, broad protection of 
civil liberties (freedom of speech, press and association) and the absence of non-elected “tute-
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lary authorities” that limit the governing power of elected officials (Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999: 
7–15).3 If militaries wield these “tutelary powers” or “reserved domains” but still accept the 
democratic game, a “tutelary democracy” evolves (Collier/Levitsky 1997; Merkel 2004). In the-
se “democracies with adjectives” (Collier/Levitsky 1997), the problem of military involvement 
in politics and the establishment of “civilian control”4 become some of the main challenges of 
democratic consolidation, since liberal democracies require the civilian control of the armed 
forces as a necessary condition (Croissant et al. 2011b). 
At the other end of the political spectrum, we find closed authoritarian regimes, in which 
no channels exist for oppositional forces to legally contest for executive power (Levitsky/Way 
2010: 7; Snyder 2006). This type includes two subcategories: closed regimes, in which we find 
no democratic institutions, and hegemonic regimes, in which formal democratic institutions 
exist on paper but are nothing more than a façade (Schedler 2002). Military regimes, in which 
“military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threat-
ened use of force” (Nordlinger 1977: 2), may fall into either category. We can distinguish be-
tween direct military regimes, in which the military forms the government, and quasi-civil-
ian regimes, which are military regimes with a civilian window dressing (civilian president, 
constitution, semi-competitive elections). The latter are military regimes in substance in the 
sense that the military holds political hegemony (Finer 1962). Moreover, the armed forces 
may also be part of the regime coalition in other forms of closed authoritarian regimes such 
as monarchies, Sultanistic regimes (e.g. the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos 1972–1986) 
and single-party regimes (North Korea). These different forms of regimes can frequently not 
be categorized accurately, although they “draw on different groups to staff government of-
fices and different segments of society for support. They have different procedures for mak-
ing decisions, different ways of handling their choice of leaders and succession, and different 
ways of responding to society and opponents” (Geddes 1999: 121). Moreover, there are often 
amalgams or hybrids of these diverse regime types.  
In general, military regimes are considered the weakest form of authoritarianism. Accord-
ing to Barbara Geddes, who analysed the stability of 163 authoritarian regimes from 1945–
1998, military regimes have an average lifespan of only seven years, while single-party re-
gimes have an average lifespan of 35 years (Geddes 1999: 121). Whereas in the 1970s and 
1980s military regimes were the most common form of authoritarian government, they have 
increasingly been transformed into “limited multiparty systems” since then (Hadenius/Teo-
rell 2007: 152). Despite these developments, the military often wields enormous influence be-
hind the scenes of these regimes. The problem of “civil–military relations” and “civilian con-
                                                 
3  Other scholars, such as Przeworski, employ a more minimalist definition that centres on contested elections 
(Przeworski et al. 2000). 
4  In civilian regimes, the armed forces are under the supremacy of the civilian government. In a democratic 
state, civilian control means that civilian authorities are responsible for making political decisions, and the 
military is responsible for implementing them. 
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trol” of the military has often been the focus of studies in post-authoritarian contexts, as civil-
ian control has often been considered a necessary condition for democratic rule. For liberal 
democracies to persist, the armed forces must be subordinate to democratically elected civil-
ian authorities (Diamond 1999; Croissant et al. 2011b). 
Earlier research on military rule has worked out various subtypes that draw on the social 
foundations of military rule, its class background and its role in economic development: The 
most important forms have been market-bureaucratic regimes, monarchic military regimes, 
single party (often socialist) military regimes, and oligarchic military regimes (Janowitz 1964; 
Huntington 1968; O’Donnell 1973; Perlmutter 1980; Remmer 1989). With the growing extinc-
tion of direct military regimes from the political scene, these concepts fall short of delineating 
the extent of military power in politics. According to Nordlinger, there are two factors that 
define the level of military intervention: the extent of power of the armed forces and their po-
litical and economic goals (Nordlinger 1977: 22). Nordlinger distinguishes three ideal types of 
military rule: rulers, guardians and moderators. As rulers, militaries dominate the regime and 
attempt to control large segments of society and the economy. They “intend to bring basic 
changes in the distribution of power by eliminating all existing power centres” (Nordlinger 
1977: 22). In both other regime types, militaries aim to preserve the status quo. Guardians 
control the government from backstage; they have not taken over the government by them-
selves but control the government informally. Moderators leave the most important positions 
in the government to civilians, but the military maintains veto power over certain policies 
(Nordlinger 1977: 22). The problem with Nordlinger’s theory is that some hidden forms of 
military rule cannot be separated clearly from civilian autocracies. It is, therefore, necessary 
to identify the exact relationship between civilian and military authorities in these regimes.  
Finer distinguishes three modes of military intervention in civil politics (Finer 1962): black-
mailing, displacement and supplantment. First, the military pressures or blackmails civilian 
authorities. The military intervenes in decision-making by threatening to withdraw its sup-
port for the regime coalition or by supporting groups that agitate against the government. 
Second, the military attempts to displace members of the cabinet. The third mode of inter-
vention is supplantment: either the military or factions within the military support rebel 
groups fighting against the government or threaten to stage a military coup. The problem 
with both Finer’s and Nordlinger’s theories is that they do not give exact criteria for delineat-
ing military intervention into politics.  
Recent innovative approaches have proposed conceptualizing military intervention in 
politics along a spectrum of military influence, military participation and military control of 
government (Welch/Smith 1974; Siaroff 2009; Croissant et al. 2011b). Siaroff designed a con-
tinuum for measuring the degree of military intervention into the political and civilian affairs 
of the state. He accounted for eleven indicators that are used to categorize the military’s inter-
vention. Siaroff envisions a continuum of civil–military relations that ranges from “civilian su-
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premacy” and “civilian control”,5 across the middle categories of conditional subordination 
and military tutelage to military control and military rule. He uses several criteria such as in-
fluence on policy-making in certain fields, representation in government, right to intervention, 
accountability for past human rights violations and autonomy over resources and processes.6 
Figure 1: Degree of Military Intervention  
Regime Type Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy Autocracy 
Degree of military  
intervention 
Civilian  
supremacy 
Civilian 
control 
Conditional  
subordination 
Military  
tutelage 
Military 
control 
Military 
rule 
Siaroff 2009: 90. 
 
However, as Croissant et al. rightly argue, civilian control also exists in autocracies. Conse-
quently, we see that regime type is not a good predictor of the type of civil–military relations 
(Croissant et al. 2011a: 194). Military officers play a decisive role in all regimes, since they are 
either part of the ruling coalition or heavily influence policy decisions in certain fields. Most 
of these regimes also depend on the military for their very survival. In some cases, they act as 
veto actors. Regime transitions within authoritarian regimes thus often lead to a different 
role for the military – it is shifted away “from the driver’s seat” to a more backseat role (Finer 
1985: 18). It is, therefore, always necessary to contextualize the military’s role in politics, 
along with its reasons for intervention, instruments and scope of power (Snyder 2006: 220). It 
is also necessary to delineate conditions for a withdrawal of the military from politics, i.e. a 
change in the degree of military intervention. In order to do this, it is necessary to identify 
factors that explain the motives for military interventions.  
3 Conducive and Unfavourable Conditions for Military Withdrawal  
In general, two theoretical schools can be identified within the research on civil–military rela-
tions (Kennedy/Louscher 1991; Nordlinger 1977: 1; Sundhaussen 1985; Croissant 2004). The 
first relies on internal military variables to explain various degrees of military intervention; 
the second points to external factors. However, neither approach is all-encompassing 
(Sundhaussen 1985: 272; Croissant 2004). Sundhaussen, who attempts to explore factors that 
facilitate a withdrawal of militaries from office, suggests combining these different theorems. 
According to Sundhaussen, the degree of military intervention into politics is the outcome of 
several mutually interdependent endogenous and extraneous factors. Departing from Finer’s 
                                                 
5  In contrast to the first category, civilians lack expertise in military affairs, do not hold the military to account 
for past human rights violations, and cannot control its internal affairs. 
6  Siaroff’s classification is based on a set of eleven indicators that are measured on a scale of 1 to 10. The higher 
the numerical score, the more comprehensive the civilian control.  
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distinction of the military’s disposition to intervene and their social opportunity structures 
(“mood” vs. “motive”), Sundhaussen argues that a withdrawal from politics is the outcome 
of two interdependent concurrent factors: the dynamics within the internal organization of 
the military itself and the political, cultural, economic and international environment that in-
fluence the military’s actions (Sundhaussen 1985: 271). The strategic options of the armed 
forces are therefore shaped by two structuralist factors: a) endogenous factors, which shape 
the disposition and ability of the military to intervene into or withdraw from politics and b) 
extraneous factors, which form conducive or unfavourable opportunity structures for the 
military’s intervention or withdrawal. Examples of extraneous factors include the inability of 
civilian governments to control political violence and attempts of political groups to draw 
the military into the political arena. Croissant argues that these two factors act as “pull fac-
tors” for the military by pulling the armed forces into the terrain of civil politics, while endoge-
nous factors operate as “push factors” by affecting the cohesion, coherence, internal resources, 
moods and organizational motives of military action (Croissant 2004: 360). Military regimes 
disengage from politics if the military’s cohesion is threatened by ideological polarization or if 
increased factionalism endangers the unity of the armed forces (Nordlinger 1977: 144; Hun-
tington 1968: 252–260; Finer 1962: 173–186): The withdrawal of the military from the political 
arena depends on the interplay of both endogenous and exogenous factors. These two sets of 
variables can be further broken down into eight variables: 1. personal interests of the mili-
tary; 2. corporate interests of the military; 3. military ideology; 4. military cohesion; 5. con-
figuration of the civilian sphere (strength of parties and civil society); 6. economic develop-
ment; 7. internal security (e.g. secessionist movements); and 8. external security (Albright 
1980: 575; Finer 1962; Sundhaussen 1985; Croissant 2004).  
Figure 2: Determinants of Military Interventions 
 
       ENDOGENOUS FACTORS         EXOGENOUS FACTORS 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
DEGREE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION 
(MILITARY RULE, MILITARY CONTROL, MILITARY TUTELAGE, CONDITIONAL 
SUBORDINATION, CIVILIAN CONTROL, CIVILIAN SUPREMACY) 
 
1. Personal interests  
2. Corporate interests 
3. Ideology 
4. Cohesion 
 
1. Civilian sphere 
2. Internal security 
3. Economy 
4. External security 
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3.1   Endogenous Factors 
A retreat of the military from political power is facilitated by the belief that civilian govern-
ments will take into account the personal and corporate interests of the military. Leading 
military officers might fear being persecuted under the new regime and being held responsi-
ble for past human rights violations. Consequently, they may be reluctant to leave office. The 
military might also have some corporate interests: It might demand sufficient budget alloca-
tions from the (civilian) government to acquire adequate equipment and armaments and to 
pay satisfactory salaries and wages. When a government fails to care for the interests of the 
military, officers will be more inclined to intervene. Moreover, certain factions or influential 
leaders within the military might have economic interests in legal or illegal businesses such 
as drug trafficking or the arms trade. The armed forces therefore might attempt to safeguard 
these interests from civilian influence. The enforcement of civilian control is hampered when 
the military is engaged in entrepreneurial roles, as the civilian government might refrain 
from implementing policies that run counter to the interests of the military. Since the mili-
tary is capable of supplanting the government, it is a far more dangerous political actor than 
other political groups. In post-authoritarian governments, the military often has institutional 
prerogatives, such as legislative seats or a high degree of representation in cabinets to lobby 
certain political groups to shield its corporate interests. Additionally, the military often has 
the ability to lobby certain criminal elements in order to stimulate unrest and to create a situ-
ation that might facilitate a return of the military into politics.  
Moreover, the ideological orientation of the military is an important factor. An ideologi-
cally coherent military that does not follow Huntington’s ideal of a non-political, “profes-
sional” military (Huntington 1957)7 but has instead expanded its role to a “new professional-
ism” (Stepan 1976) is far less willing to withdraw from politics. These soldiers believe that 
regular political interventions are their moral duty as they often identify themselves with the 
national interest. On the other hand, a “democratic professionalism” of the armed forces 
(Fitch 1998) may facilitate the subordination to civilian authorities, since the armed forces ac-
cept the supremacy of the civilian government and the constitutional order. Additionally, 
military factionalism can influence the military’s decision to withdraw from politics. The de-
cision to return to the barracks must be agreed upon by all military factions. An increased 
factionalism – which means the division of the armed forces along class interests or ethnic 
and/or religious loyalties – increases the likelihood of counter-coups and civil war in situa-
tions in which power is fragmented and dispersed. 
                                                 
7  Huntington argued for what he called “objective civilian control”, focusing on a politically neutral, autono-
mous, professional officer corps. This autonomous professionalism is based on a special esprit de corps and 
sense of distinct military corporateness, which prevents officers from interfering in politics (Huntington 1957). 
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3.2   Exogenous Factors 
It is often argued that military interventions in politics take place merely when the civilian 
government proves unable to govern the country effectively, when they are unable to solve 
internal conflicts and manage security threats peacefully. Intense political polarization and 
the lack of mature political institutions to solve political conflicts therefore have been the 
most important preconditions for the return of the military into the political arena. However, 
this hypothesis implies the existence of civilian governments. In cases where the military has 
ruled a country for decades, such civilian structures are often weak or non-existent. Strong 
civil societies based on social movements, political parties or middle classes seem to be more 
important to force the military out of power. In similar contexts, students often act as a van-
guard to force the military out of office.  
Additionally, it is important for these different groups to form a consensus on common 
goals and future directions in order to negotiate the military’s retreat from power. In this 
context, it is important to offer the military certain incentives that draw them to their side. 
Moreover, attacks by guerrillas or secessionist movements might give the army the pretext to 
stay in power or pull the armed forces back into domestic politics. The opportunity structure 
for military intervention is favourable in situations where there is no consensus about the 
rule of the political game, where there is considerable uncertainty about the future of the 
state or where there are external threats to national security. However, an environment con-
ducive to military disengagement prevails if the civilian government enjoys broad legitimacy 
due to its social and economic policies, as long as there is a general consensus on the rules of 
the political game and the role of the military therein. It must be emphasized that the preva-
lence of these points is not the same in all countries. They affect the dynamics in various re-
gimes at different points in time and in various ways. However, it is the interplay of these in-
ternal and external factors that leads to the withdrawal of the military.  
4 The Military in Burmese Politics 1948–2010 
The Burmese military (Tatmadaw) has been deeply involved in politics since the country’s 
independence from Great Britain in 1948. As its formation in 1942 preceded the existence of 
an independent state and the officer corps was politicized as a liberating force during the 
struggle for national independence, the army could retrospectively assume the role of guard-
ian of the Burmese state and bulwark of national independence. Although the 1947 Constitu-
tion established a democratic system of government and the military accepted civilian su-
premacy, the army was able to gradually expand its political role (Taylor 1985; Callahan 
2001; Callahan 2003). Both external and internal factors explain the increasing assertiveness 
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of the Burmese military: the outbreak of ethnic and communist rebellions8 after the departure 
of the British triggered the institutional modernization of the armed forces, which did not 
keep pace with the civilian government capacities of the national state. In the 1950s the mili-
tary increasingly took over administrative and civilian functions and claimed a substantial 
part (one-third to one-half) of the national budget for internal security. However, unlike its 
Thai or Indonesian counterparts, the Burmese army did not develop its own business net-
work at this point in time (Taylor 1985: 28). In 1958, increasing factionalism within the ruling 
Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL) led to a split in the party and a growing insta-
bility in the parliamentary system. The officer corps feared that the split could also weaken 
the army’s unity. General Ne Win urged the civilian government of Prime Minister U Nu to 
temporarily transfer power to the armed forces (“Caretaker Government”, 1958–1960). Dur-
ing this period, the officer corps developed a praetorian ethos, which was grounded in the 
belief that it was more effective than its civilian counterparts. The military adopted a new ide-
ology, which defined the role of the military in broad national security terms as being re-
sponsible for the defence of the national objectives of establishing “peace and the rule of law”, 
“democracy” and a “socialist economy” (Myoe 2008: 16–44). This prepared the groundwork 
for the “new professionalism” of the Burmese military (Than 2001: 165-166): The military also 
expanded its business activities into the banking sector, construction industry and fishing, and 
it became the most powerful business organization in the country (Taylor 1985: 32).  
Although the “Caretaker Government” handed back power in February 1960, General Ne 
Win staged a coup in March 1962, which brought army leaders into power and “eliminated 
their civilian counterparts once and for all” (Callahan 2001: 422). U Nu’s decision to make 
Buddhism the state religion, along with the calls by ethnic groups for greater autonomy and 
secession from the union prepared the groundwork for the intervention of the military, which 
stepped in to save the country from disintegration. Since then, the military has prevented the 
emergence of any autonomous centres of influence. General Ne Win formed a Revolutionary 
Council, which ruled the country by fiat until 1974. It abolished the 1947 Constitution, dis-
solved parliament and banned all political parties. The military government nationalized the 
economy under the banner of the “Burmese Way to Socialism” and cut all ties to the outside 
world. It set up its own Leninist party, the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which 
ran the country unchallenged for over 25 years (Silverstein 1977). Apart from one short out-
break of student demonstrations in 1974,9 army and party leaders were able to control socie-
ty. The military became the backbone of the socialist one-party state (1974–1988), in which 
                                                 
8  These rebellions were supported by foreign powers. The Kuomintang rebels (KMT) were supported by the 
CIA, while the rebellion of the communists was supported by the Chinese.  
9  Workers and students in Rangoon protested against inflation and food shortages after the implementation of 
policies that favoured the rural economy. The military used force and at least 22 people were killed. Universi-
ties were closed. In December 1974, students and monks protested at the state’s funeral arrangements for for-
mer UN Secretary General U Than (Taylor 2010: 36).  
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General Ne Win was both party chairman and president. Based on his personal influence on 
the army and the party, he kept his subordinates divided and controlled all potential rivals 
through regular purges. Active and retired military officers dominated the cabinets and rub-
ber stamp parliaments. In the closing years of the socialist period, the influence of the mili-
tary waned, since the BSPP was transformed into a socialist mass party – a considerable per-
centage of the party leadership, however, remained in military hands (Taylor 2010: 318–321).  
The military-backed, socialist one-party regime crumbled from within in 1987/88, when 
the country was facing a severe economic crisis. In 1987 the World Bank had given the coun-
try the status of Least Developed Country. Further economic mismanagement led to massive 
student demonstrations in 1988, which forced General Ne Win to resign as party chairman in 
July 1988. The protests escalated into a broad-based, countrywide democracy movement that 
continued until September 1988, when the military reorganized itself, staged a coup and bru-
tally cracked down on the movement, killing thousands of demonstrators (Steinberg 2001: 3–
12; Lintner 1990). 
The coup of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) re-established direct 
military rule on 18 August 1988. The military revoked the 1974 Constitution, dissolved parlia-
ment and concentrated executive, legislative and judicial powers in military hands. When seiz-
ing power, the junta under the leadership of Saw Maung promised to hand over power after 
holding fresh multiparty elections. However, the military council failed to acknowledge the re-
sults of the May 1990 elections, which ended in a landslide victory for the oppositional NLD.10 
Acting in the manner of a caretaker government, the military argued that the country lacked a 
constitution for transferring power to a new government. Military rule has been heavily con-
tested since then: The NLD and the ethnic political parties have called for a swift transfer of 
power and subsequently mobilized the international community to support their demands. As 
a consequence, the military found itself under heavy criticism from Western states, interna-
tional NGOs and human rights advocates. The military instead attempted to safeguard its 
leading role in politics (see below). It tried to draft a new constitution and invited political par-
ties for a National Convention, which started work in 1993 but came to a halt in 1996, when the 
NLD left the convention because of a lack of debate and undemocratic principles. Lacking elec-
toral legitimacy, the military junta ruled with an iron fist, suppressing all avenues of dissent 
and controlling society: Members of the opposition – including NLD leader and Nobel Peace 
Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and other leading figures of her party – had to spend long pe-
riods under house arrest or had to flee the country due to military persecution. The number of 
political prisoners has remained high over the last two decades. 
After 1990 the military embarked on a massive state-building programme, which has 
concentrated on modernizing the country’s weak infrastructure (construction of roads, 
                                                 
10  The National League for Democracy gained 59.87 per cent of the votes and 81 per cent of the seats in the elec-
tions. The successor party of the BSPP, which was close to the military, the National Unity Party (NUP) was 
heavily defeated, securing only 25.12 per cent of the votes. See Taylor 2010: 409.  
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bridges, hospitals, etc.) and negotiating a series of ceasefires with ethnic insurgent groups. 
The latter could substantially reduce the internal armed threat that it faced (see below). In 
1997 the junta reorganized and renamed itself the State Peace and Development Council in 
order to signal a shift from restoring order to fostering peace and development. The modern-
ization of the coercive apparatus has been at the heart of the state-building programme. This 
entailed an expansion of the armed forces from 186,000 to more than 370,000 soldiers (Calla-
han 2003; Selth 2002; Myoe 2008). The military has subsequently enhanced its territorial rep-
resentation in the country, which it deemed necessary for building roads and infrastructure. 
It has also increased its surveillance capacities. The military has allocated huge sums for de-
fence expenditures throughout the 1990s (see Table 1). The military government spent more 
than 1 billion USD on 150 new combat aircrafts, 30 new naval vessels, 170 tanks, 2,500 ar-
moured personnel carriers, as well as rocket-launching systems, infantry weapons and other 
hardware (Callahan 2001: 424). The military has also stirred up nationalism in order to 
achieve a rally-around-the-flag effect; moreover, it has been pointing out its historical role as 
builder of nation and state (Steinberg 2006: 102–110; Taylor 2010). 
Table 1: Burma’s Defence Expenditure by Year (1988–2003)11 
Year MMK (in billions) % of GDP 
1988 1.6 2.1 
1989 3.7 3 
1990 5.2 3.4 
1991 5.9 3.2 
1992 8.4 3.4 
1993 12.7 3.5 
1994 16.7 3.5 
1995 22.3 3.7 
1996 27.7 3.5 
1997 29.8 2.7 
1998 37.3 2.3 
1999 43.7 2.0 
2000 58.9 2.3 
2001 63.9 1.8 
2002 73.1 1.3 
2003 - 2.3 
              Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm; Note: from 2002–2010  
         no data available; data for 2002–2003 provided by Taylor 2010. 
                                                 
11  The evaluation of the actual level of Burma’s annual defence expenditure is very difficult given the regime’s 
opaqueness and secrecy. The expenditures vary significantly between different sources.  For a discussion of 
various estimations see Selth (2002: 131–145).  
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With regard to economic liberalization, the military formally embraced a market economy 
after 1990. However, the economy of the country has remained completely state-controlled 
over the last two decades.12 Moreover, after 1988 the military further expanded its business 
activities and economic bases. It built up the most important conglomerates in the country, 
the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic 
Cooperation (MEC), which were given licences in diverse businesses such as construction, 
hotels, tourism, transport, gem and jade extraction and agriculture. As a consequence, the 
military became the most important business actor in the country (Selth 2002: 130). 
5 From Direct Rule to Military Control: Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy”  
The military returned to civilian rule only after it succeeded in designing a political system 
that safeguarded its own core interests. The political changes fall short of a genuine demo-
cratic transition, since the military remains fully in control of the political system after hav-
ing successfully manipulated the 2010 elections. Additionally, it has managed to orchestrate 
this transition process at every single stage. The military has continuously restricted political 
space so that oppositional forces have virtually no room to manoeuvre. Officially announced 
in late 2003 by General Khin Nyunt, the military’s roadmap to “disciplined democracy” envi-
sioned the installation of a new political system in seven steps: The first step was the recon-
vening of the National Convention to finalize the Constitution’s basic principles, which were 
introduced at the 1993 National Convention. These codified the military’s leading role in the 
participation of the state.13 Like the first National Convention (1993–1996), the second was 
“marred by a lack of inclusiveness, heavy restrictions on public debate and little input by the 
participants into the final product” (Pederson 2011: 50). The two main opposition parties, the 
NLD and the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD), boycotted the National Conven-
tion. Although some ethnic parties participated, they ended up frustrated by their inability to 
influence the outcome. The drafting of the new constitution was finalized in February 2008, 
and in May 2008 it was formally approved in a nationwide referendum. The referendum was 
apparently manipulated, since the official results of 94.4 per cent in favour with a voter turn-
out of 98 per cent lacked any credibility (Pedersen 2011: 51). The new constitution enshrines 
military control. Although it formally establishes a multiparty democracy with elections for 
national and regional assemblies, the military will maintain a dominant role in the years to 
                                                 
12  Burma was continuously ranked among the lowest in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedoms 
throughout the 1990s. In 2011, it was ranked 174th of 179 countries (Heritage 2011).  
13  The main objectives as later laid down in the Constitution were a) non-disintegration of the Union, b) non-
disintegration of national solidarity, c) perpetuation of sovereignty, d) flourishing of a genuine, disciplined 
multiparty democratic system, e) enhancement of the eternal principles of justice, liberty and equality in the 
Union, and f) enabling of the Defence Services to be able to participate in the national political leadership role 
of the state (Constitution of Myanmar, 2008).  
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come. Of all regional and national parliament seats, 25 per cent are reserved for the military, 
and security-related ministries are also promised to the military. Moreover, the military re-
mains fully autonomous, since it is not subject to civilian control. 
The SPDC also managed to manipulate elections in November 2010 in a way that en-
sured military dominance. The junta fielded its own proxy party, the Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (USDP), which is an offshoot of the Union Solidarity and Development 
Association (USDA), a mass organization with approximately 12 million members estab-
lished by SLORC in 1993 to support its political agenda. Shortly before the elections, many 
leading SPDC generals, ministers and members of the military discarded their uniforms to 
join the party, which was led by former Prime Minister Thein Sein. The USDP had the finan-
cial backing of the regime, while the opposition faced severe financial hurdles because par-
ties were required to pay high registration fees. Altogether, the pre-election playing field was 
tilted heavily in favour of the USDP (Bünte 2010; ICG 2011; NDI 2010). The main opposition 
party, the NLD, split over the issue of running in the election. While Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
NLD boycotted the election, a splinter group, the National Democratic Force (NDF), ran in 
the elections and secured a few seats in the new parliament. The military-sponsored USDP 
won a huge majority of seats – 80 per cent in the lower house and 77 per cent in the upper 
house. The landslide victory of the USDP has arguably been the outcome of massive manipu-
lations of the vote count (ICG 2011). 
The transition to “disciplined democracy” has been accompanied by a wave of privatiza-
tion measures. Two hundred and seventy-one state-owned companies have reportedly been 
sold to Than Shwe’s closest cronies, such as Thay Zar, Zaw Zar and Chit Khaing (Myanmar 
Times, Govert. Property Auction nets K800b, 4 April 2011). While the military conglomerates 
have been weakened in this process, Than Shwe’s informal influence has been consolidated. 
Altogether, the influence of the military conglomerates in the economy remains considerable.  
Summing up, the generals’ transition ensured a return to civilian rule without relinquish-
ing de facto military control of the government. The military still remains the arbiter of power 
in the country, though it has created new political institutions that might develop some auton-
omy of their own in the future. Currently, the military dominates all important state institu-
tions: The cabinet announced in March 2011 includes 26 retired military officials or former 
junta ministers and only four civilians. The number of civilians included in the cabinet is not 
higher than it was in 1993, when the SLORC included four civilians in its cabinet. Moreover, 
of the 14 chief ministers at the division and state levels, six are former SPDC commanders, 
and three are former SPDC ministers. Moreover, the military also controls a quarter of both 
legislatures directly, which were filled with lower-ranking officers, ensuring that the military 
bloc remains cohesive and compliant with the wishes of the military superiors (ICG 2011: 3). 
Since a quorum of 75 per cent is necessary to change the Constitution, the military effectively 
has a veto power over constitutional changes. Within the government, the new National De-
fence and Security Council is the most powerful institution, which is controlled by the com-
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mander-in-chief of the armed forces. In terms of civil–military relations, the military remains 
fully autonomous subject to neither executive nor judicial civilian authority.  
However, other power centres might develop some autonomy of their own in the future: 
The parliament – although dominated by the USDP and the military at the moment – might 
contribute to greater openness by debating key bills and criticizing the government. Another 
power centre is the ruling party, the USDP, which controls over half of the seats in both 
houses of the legislature: Although packed with former military men and led by former 
SPDC General Shwe Mann, it might develop policy initiatives of their own in the future. An-
other important aspect of the military’s transition is the creation of regional governments, 
which are the seed of political decentralization. Although the local governments are headed 
by a chief minister appointed by the central government, the existence of elected regional 
legislatures allows a degree of ethnic autonomy within the ethnic states. This is especially 
important for those states where ethnic political parties have sizable minorities and whose 
representatives will be included as ministers in the local governments. However, the degree 
of military control over local autonomy will be considerable.  
All in all, one has to conclude that the military’s withdrawal from power does not mean a 
retreat into the barracks but rather a further institutionalization of military control. The mili-
tary has managed to establish a competitive authoritarian regime, in which it remains the ar-
biter of power.  
6 Endogenous and Exogenous Factors in the Military’s Withdrawal (1988–2011) 
To assess the internal reasons for the military’s withdrawal from the apex of power, one has 
to look at the changing dynamics within the military regime, the development of the mili-
tary’s interests, ideology and coherence over time. The Tatmadaw’s leadership has always 
seen itself as the defender of national unity, and internal security has always been directed 
toward domestic politics. When the military-backed socialist regime was under the imminent 
threat of breakdown due to the student revolt in 1988, the military reorganized itself and em-
barked on a massive modernization programme. Harbouring a strong distrust of politicians 
and ethnic leaders, the armed forces conflated their own interests with those of the regime 
and government (Selth 2002; Myoe 2008; Than 1998: 391). Apart from strong nationalistic 
feelings and a strong esprit de corps, the “persistent sense of vulnerability” (Selth 2002: 43) of 
the regime seemed to have contributed to the modernization of both army and state. After 
1988, the regime seemed to have feared cooperation between democracy activists and ethnic 
insurgents. Arguably, at various points in time, the government has felt there was a threat of 
a foreign-led invasion: During the student demonstrations, Burma’s state-owned media had 
reported about the presence of a US naval fleet in the country’s territorial waters. The regime 
was also concerned that foreign powers could help insurgents on the border to develop 
armed forces that would challenge the new regime in Rangoon.  The top generals also may 
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have feared an Iraq-like intervention by the US or a UN-led intervention like in East Timor. 
The relocation of the administrative capital from Rangoon to Naypyitaw in 2006 underscored 
the continuity of this point (Myoe 2007). As a consequence, the military regime was “pre-
pared to take whatever measures were required to recover and consolidate its grip on gov-
ernment” (Selth 2002: 33). The regime formulated three broad “national causes”: 1. non-
disintegration of the Union, 2. non-disintegration of national solidarity; and 3. perpetuation 
of national sovereignty, from which it derived its own “Defence Mission”. The third “cause” 
gave the army a leadership role in the management of the state (Selth 2002: 30).14  
The modernization of the armed forces has been a huge challenge for the military’s cohe-
sion, since different factions of the armed forces developed different organizational and cor-
porate interests. Nevertheless, the military has managed to remain relatively coherent over 
the last two decades. It managed to avoid a split between the hardliners and “softliners” and 
a subsequent schism in the coercive apparatus (Stepan 1988: 55), which in some Latin Ameri-
can and East Asian cases has led to a liberalization of the political systems through elite pacts 
between military “softliners” and oppositional moderates. Although the Burmese armed 
forces have not been free from factionalism and internal rifts, the military junta has eased 
these tensions through purges at the top level, routine reshuffles and institutional reorgani-
zations. These measures have strengthened the unity of the military and the centralized com-
mand structure under the leadership of General Than Shwe, who himself became com-
mander and chairman of the SLORC after a palace coup against junta chief Saw Maung in 
1992. Patronage and increasing surveillance have also guaranteed the long-term, monolithic 
cohesion of the armed forces (Callahan 2001; Min 2008; Kyaw 2009). 
One set of intra-military tensions has resulted from factionalism at the top of the SPDC. 
In the early 1990s, SLORC was dominated by the triumvirate of Senior General Than Shwe, 
General Maung Aye and Major General Khin Nyunt. Khin Nyunt was the head of Military 
Intelligence (MI), an extremely powerful body that was deeply engaged in business activi-
ties, especially at regional levels, where it was colliding with the interests of regular army of-
ficers. General Khin Nyunt was often seen as a “moderate” because he was the architect of 
numerous ceasefire agreements with ethnic groups, negotiated with opposition leader Aung 
San Suu Kyi about possible reforms and represented the junta as the liaison to the interna-
tional community. As he became too powerful for the other two leading generals Than Shwe 
and Maung Aye – supposedly “hardliners” – in September 2004 Khin Nyunt was purged and 
his intelligence apparatus was dismantled. The purge allegedly came after he refused to fol-
low an order from Senior General Than Shwe to relinquish the intelligence apparatus and 
punish his corrupt intelligence officers (Min 2008). In the years following the purge, Senior 
General Than Shwe has regularly promoted his followers into top positions, thus centralizing 
                                                 
14  According to Maung Aung Myoe, Than Shwe made a secret speech to his senior military commanders in July 
1997, in which he explained Burma’s defence policy for the first time (Myoe 2008). This policy, however, corre-
sponds to earlier policies of the regime (Selth 2002: 31). 
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the command structure and strengthening the unity of the armed forces. With this move, the 
hardliners within the SPDC have resoundingly defeated the “softliners” (Callahan 2007: 37; 
Kyaw 2009: 288; Min 2008). 
Another set of intra-military tensions was put to rest in the mid-1990s: Tensions had 
mounted between the junta in Rangoon and powerful regional commanders, which were given 
powers in their respective regions to conduct their own administrative and military affairs. The 
power of these “warlords” was subsequently “re-centralized” by requiring regional command-
ers to serve as members of the junta and by regularly assigning regional commanders to posi-
tions in the War Office and the cabinet in Rangoon (Callahan 2007; Min 2008: 1025).  
Whereas negative consequences of factionalism at the top along with central regional re-
lations within the regime have been minimized through institutional reorganization and reg-
ular reshuffles, the issue of leadership change at the upper echelons remained a serious prob-
lem. The “transition to disciplined democracy” has solved these problems for both the junta 
chief and the top generals in the military hierarchy. It provided a “retirement plan” for Sen-
ior General Than Shwe, who has stepped down from the position of junta leader and com-
mander in chief of the armed forces.15 General Maung Aye has also retired. Other top leaders 
and regional commanders have discarded their army uniforms, changed into party dresses 
and use their power, for instance, as chief ministers in the regions. These changes have eased 
generational pressures within the army, since a younger cohort of military leaders can now 
rise within the ranks without creating too much competition or risk of a military coup. Some 
elements in the armed forces did not support the loss of power and resisted the new civilian 
posts assigned to them by Senior General Than Shwe. In February, the SPDC reportedly 
placed Lt. General Myint Aung under house arrest because he allegedly refused to be trans-
ferred to the less powerful position of defence minister (Mizzima News, Myint Aung Rejects 
Defence Minister Job: Reportedly under Arrest, 10 February 2011; Irrawaddy, Myint Aung 
Dismissed, Placed under House Arrest, 10 February 2011).  
To assess the external influences on the military’s withdrawal, one has to look at the con-
figuration of civilian forces in the light of existing opportunity structures and the internal 
and external security environment during the last two decades.16 All in all, the SLORC/SPDC 
has managed to prevent any major organization from effectively toppling the military regime 
over the last two decades. The degree of repression has been constantly high, as the military 
banned assemblies of more than five people, censored the media and effectively controlled 
                                                 
15  He is believed to use his personal influence through patronage and personal connections from behind the 
scenes (Wall Street Journal, 16 May 2011; ICG 2011).  
16  The analysis does not look at the impact of economic factors due to the unreliability of the Burmese govern-
ment’s official economic data. Burma’s economy is heavily dependent on the income generated by the export 
of natural resources (above all natural gas). Its economic performance is heavily contested. Since the country 
is not integrated into the world economy, the impact of external economic factors (e.g. the recent financial cri-
sis) can be considered quite low (see McCarthy 2000; Turnell 2008).  
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oppositional forces. Whereas the country has only a very small middle class and no strong 
labour organizations or mass organizations – except those of the regime-sponsored USDA – 
the main threats to the regime emanated from actions of the NLD, remnants of the 1988 stu-
dent movement and Buddhist monks. When the military regime has been threatened, it has 
constantly used harsh measures to suppress these “destructive elements”. The NLD has 
come under intense pressure since the early 1990s, when it engaged in a confrontational pol-
icy to force the junta to convene parliament and transfer power. Leading members of the 
NLD have been under house arrest for most of the last 20 years,17 while local party cadres 
were often intimidated, harassed or jailed. Many of them also had to flee the country due to 
constant repression. Under constant pressure from the military regime, the NLD leadership 
lacked room to manoeuvre to build up its own strength and force the military out of office. 
Moreover, it subsequently “failed to come up with concrete strategies to deal with the mili-
tary government” (Kyaw 2007: 41; also Zin 2010). Apart from government repression, fac-
tional infighting and low social capital also weakened the strategic importance of the NLD, 
which was not able to profit from the factional struggles in the SPDC (Hlaing 2007: 17). On 
the contrary, after 20 years of repression the SPDC has managed to weaken the opposition 
even further, since it has managed effectively to split the opposition: While the NLD decided 
to boycott the general’s 2010 election18 and subsequently lost its status as an official party, a 
splinter group, the National Democratic Force (NDF), participated and managed to secure 12 
seats in both houses of parliament altogether. Despite the general political failure of the NLD 
to bring about a transfer of power, however, the NLD was able to seriously undermine the 
military government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Many Western 
countries linked their Burma policy to the fate of opposition leader and Nobel Prize laureate 
Aung San Suu Kyi: After she began to call for sanctions in 1997, many Western states enacted 
targeted sanctions in order to protest Burma’s human rights abuses and its foot dragging in 
terms of moving toward democracy. Sanctions were even tightened after the attack on Aung 
San Suu Kyi in 2003 (see below).  
Another part of the opposition against the military has been the student movement, 
which has been sporadically active after 1988. For instance, in 1996 university students 
staged demonstrations in order to call for improvements in the education system. The mili-
tary reacted with repression: Over 100 students were arrested and jailed. Most university 
buildings were closed for years and later relocated to suburban areas to prevent further de-
monstrations.  
                                                 
17  Party leader Aung San Suu Kyi was put under house arrest for the first time in July 1989 for “endangering the 
state”. She was released in 1995, but was not allowed to travel outside of Rangoon. Altogether, she has spent 
15 years under house arrest. The last house arrest lasted from 2003 till 2010. Shortly after the elections, she was 
again released.  
18  The NLD boycotted the elections because the leadership considered the election laws unfair.  
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The most serious internal threat to military power, however, came from the demonstra-
tions of Buddhist monks in September 2007, which ended in another brutal crackdown and 
the death of 31 Buddhist monks.19 Although these demonstrations have not threatened the 
cohesion within the ranks of the military, they have challenged its claim to traditional legiti-
macy as rulers of the devoutly Buddhist country (Hlaing 2009; Steinberg 2006: 94–97; McCar-
thy 2008: 312).  
Summing up, one can say that oppositional groups failed to bring about a regime change in 
the country. They have neither forced the military into dialogue nor helped to ease repression. 
They have, however, seriously undermined the legitimacy (international, traditional) of the mili-
tary government, which might have accelerated the “transition to disciplined democracy”.  
With regard to internal security, the situation has completely changed since 1988. When 
the army took over power again in 1988, more than 20 substantial insurgent groups re-
mained active with about 40,000 soldiers combined (Smith 1999, 2006; Taylor 2010: 443). 
Some of these groups had full control over their territory, with self-administration in foreign 
relations, school and hospital management. Since the beginning of the 1990s the security sit-
uation has completely changed. During the 1990s and 2000s the military regime managed to 
negotiate ceasefire agreements with most ethnic groups. Today, there are only three numeri-
cally important groups fighting the government that no longer control substantial territory: 
the Karen National Union (KNU),20 with an estimated 2,000 combatants, the Karenni Na-
tional Progressive Party (KNPP), with approximately 500–1,000 militia members, and the 
Shan State Army South with 3,000–4,000 soldiers.21 The government has officially signed 
ceasefire agreements with 17 ethnic groups, which allowed these groups a certain degree of 
autonomy, often including the concession to maintain their arms and control over their terri-
tory (Petersen 2008; South 2004; Smith 2006; Oo/Min 2007).22 While the overall security situa-
tion has improved markedly since the early 1990s, there is still ongoing violence and the risk 
of a renewed escalation of violence. Whether the transition to indirect rule will entail a new 
round of violence between the new government and the ethnic groups remains to be seen.23 
                                                 
19  The protests started in August 2007 with small-scale demonstrations of students and democracy activists 
against the sudden increase in (government-controlled) fuel prices. When several demonstrating Buddhist 
monks were mistreated by the security forces in Pakkoku in September 2007, the movement turned into a 
countrywide protest movement. The largely religious protest quickly gathered momentum as the All-Burma 
Monks Alliance. 
20  The KNU entered into ceasefire talks with the military government. The “gentleman’s agreement”, however, 
broke down after the purge of General Khin Nyunt.  
21  There is also a further dozen small splinter groups operating at the Indian-Burmese and Thai-Burmese bor-
ders. These groups have only a few hundred soldiers.  
22  As Ashley South (2004) notes, the precise terms of these ceasefires are not known, but in general it is clear that 
the terms are not uniform across all groups with which the government has ceasefire agreements.  
23  There are some indications that the transition to “disciplined democracy” has fuelled ethnic conflicts. The mil-
itary government’s plan to transform the armies of the ethnic groups into border guards of the Tatmadaw has 
met with fierce resistance from certain ethnic groups. While smaller forces have agreed to integrate into the 
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The international security situation has also completely changed since the early 1990s, 
and the military junta has been confronted with a new strategic environment. Most members 
of the international community have attempted to persuade the military government to 
change its behaviour vis-à-vis its own citizens. We can identify three approaches to achieving 
this goal:  
1) The “hardliners”, led by the US, the UK and to a lesser extent the EU, have imposed eco-
nomic sanctions, including an effective ban on financial assistance, travel restrictions and 
an arms embargo. In 2005, the US also succeeded in bringing the attention of the UN Secu-
rity Council to Burma, where the US declared the situation a threat to regional security. 
When the generals did not allow foreign aid to come into the country in the wake of the 
cyclone Nargis, some Western politicians also invoked the concept of “responsibility to 
protect” to further enhance the pressure on the junta (Bünte 2008; Haake 2008). In gen-
eral, most states attempted to force the generals to accept the 1990s election results and 
return to the barracks. During the last decade, however, the approaches have softened 
and focused on the release of political prisoners, national reconciliation and human 
rights themes. However, implicit in this more nuanced approach is a “strong demand for 
regime change” (Selth 2008: 287). These political and economic measures against Burma 
were denounced as interference in Burma’s own internal affairs and were thus firmly re-
jected. Senior spokesmen for the regime accused Western powers of neocolonialism and 
of trying to harm Burma’s economy and attempting to dictate domestic politics. 
2) The second approach has been more pragmatic. In line with the charter of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Burma became a member in 1997, the 
ASEAN governments have attempted to engage Burma. The Asian way of avoiding di-
rect criticism was believed to be more successful, as it would allow the junta to build up 
contacts to the outside world and to foster economic development. Continued economic 
growth would eventually lead to increasing spaces for civil society and acceptance of in-
ternational norms.  
3) The third group, led by China, Russia and India, has developed close ties to the junta. 
These countries attempt to promote greater stability in the country in order to further 
their own strategic interests (Selth 2008; Haake 2010; Holliday 2009).  
Given the unreliability of the Burmese economic data and the lack of access to Burma’s hard-
liner generals, it is difficult to say precisely what all these approaches have achieved over the 
past two decades. It is safe to say, however, that no economic sanction regime can work ef-
fectively when the sanctioned regime has access to finances, arms and diplomatic support. 
The pragmatists have been equally unsuccessful in encouraging far-reaching political re-
                                                                                                                                                        
future system, stronger groups such as Shan State Army North, the New Mon State Party and the United Wa 
State Army (UWSA) have rejected this proposal. Another sign of ethnic conflicts is the breakdown of the 
ceasefire with the KIO in June 2011 (TNI 2011).  
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forms. One can conclude that “external factors have been largely incidental in this process” 
(Selth 2008: 288). Indeed, it can be said that despite all the measures taken against Burma 
over the last two decades, the regime has become stronger and the army could even tighten 
its grip over the country.  
7 Summary and Conclusion 
The military’s withdrawal from the apex of power in March 2011 does not signal a full retreat 
from politics. The generals’ transition ensured a return to civilian rule without relinquishing 
de facto military control of the government. The military remains the arbiter of power in the 
country. It dominates all important state institutions. During its transition to “disciplined de-
mocracy”, it has succeeded in designing a new political system, in which it controls im-
portant state institutions. The military has institutionalized its “leading role” in the new 
competitive authoritarian system. There is some room for autonomy of civilian forces within 
the ruling party, which until now has been dominated by former generals. Due to the privat-
ization drive in recent years, the role of the armed forces’ conglomerates in the economy has 
been diminished. However, the conglomerates still remain the most important business ac-
tors in the country, although the generals’ cronies have managed to secure some of the key 
state assets.  
Why did the military abandon the driver’s seat, and what accounts for the transition 
from military rule to military control? This paper proposes that the new situation can be at-
tributed to a transformation in the internal and external factors that impact the military’s 
moods and motives as well as its disposition to intervene. Table 2 illustrates these factors and 
evaluates their positive or negative impact on military intervention.  
Some points stand out: In general, the conditions for a retreat of the military from politics 
on the whole are quite negative and have only slightly improved over the last two decades. 
The long endurance of military rule, the officers’ deeply entrenched self-perception as guard-
ians of the unitary state, the deep mistrust of politicians, the ongoing armed conflict within 
the country (despite a much-improved situation since the mid-1990s), the constant fear of ex-
ternal intervention in various guises – all these conditions have remained more or less the 
same during the last two decades.  
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Table 2: Endogenous and Exogenous Factors of Military Intervention in Burma (1990–2011) 
 Early 1990s Early 2000s End of 2000s 
Endogenous Factors    
Ideological cohesion Supporters of new 
professionalism (-1) 
Supporters of new  
professionalism (-1) 
Supporters of new pro-
fessionalism (younger 
generation might be 
more professional) (-1) 
Organizational cohe-
sion in military junta 
(SLORC/SPDC) 
High degree of  
factionalization (-1) 
Medium degree of  
factionalization (0) 
Stable factionalization 
(+1) 
Personal interest Leadership vacuum, 
fear of personal  
persecution (-1) 
Consolidated leader-
ship, still fear of perso-
nal persecution (0) 
Safe succession, fear of 
personal persecution 
reduced (+1) 
Economic interests Economic interests out-
side military sphere (-1) 
Economic interests out-
side military sphere (-1) 
Economic interests out-
side military sphere (-1) 
Exogenous Factors    
Civilian forces No consensus on mili-
tary role in politics / 
high degree of  
polarization (- 1) 
No consensus on mili-
tary role / high degree 
of polarization (-1) 
No consensus on mili-
tary role in politics / 
high degree of  
polarization (-1) 
Internal security High rate of violent 
conflict (-1) 
Medium rate of politi-
cal conflict (-1) 
Medium rate of politi-
cal conflict (-1) 
External security  Perceived external 
threats (-1) 
Perceived external 
threats (-1) 
Perceived external 
threats (-1) 
Economy       (0)      (0)      (0) 
Scale from -8 to 8  
(unweighted)  
     (-7)      -5      -3 
Key:  +1 means conducive, 0 means neutral, -1 means negative. 
 
Second, the retreat from direct rule and transition to military control can be attributed to sev-
eral internal factors. The transition toward “disciplined democracy” has solved the problem 
of leadership change in the armed forces for both junta chief Than Shwe and top generals in 
the military hierarchy, who have either retired or discarded their uniforms. These changes 
have eased generational pressures within the army, since a younger cohort of military lead-
ers can now rise within the ranks without creating too much competition and risks of a mili-
tary coup. Since the old guard has managed to design a political system under military con-
trol, they can also resign without having to fear being persecuted or being held responsible 
for past human rights violations.  
Third, exogenous factors have hardly changed over the last two decades. Although many 
military regimes worldwide have been transformed due to changing external environments 
(Siaroff 2009; Croissant et al. 2011), the exogenous environment of military rule in Burma has 
remained more or less constant for the last two decades. The opportunity structures have 
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hardly allowed the military to abdicate: The opposition has attempted to force the military to 
accept the results of the 1990s election and transfer power. It has used a confrontational strat-
egy to force leading generals to transfer power. Moreover, it has attempted to mobilize the 
international community to question the legitimacy of the ruling junta. These strategies had a 
huge impact on the international community, which in recent years has both strengthened its 
engagement (UN, ASEAN) and its sanction tools (US, UK). However, neither of these strate-
gies has achieved the desired results. The military, which has managed to modernize its co-
ercive and repressive tools in recent years, has curtailed the room to manoeuvre of the politi-
cal and ethnic opposition. It has also managed to split the opposition into a more moderate 
group, which is now working within the military-dominated system, and a hardline group. 
However, it might have been the lacking “external” acceptance and growing “internal” pres-
sures that led the military government to transfer power to a new civilian government and 
change from military rule to military control. Yet, the transition to “disciplined democracy” 
falls short of a genuine transition to democracy, since every single step of the generals’ tran-
sition has been carefully guarded and kept under control. The transition established a “com-
petitive authoritarian regime”, in which the playing field was heavily tilted toward the party 
dominated by the military.24 These findings confirm the dictum of O’Donnell and Schmitter 
that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of 
important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating 
cleavages between hardliners and softliners” (O’Donnell/Schmitter 1985: 19). If these divi-
sions do not come to the fore in military regimes, or if hardliners prevail, the evolving transi-
tion might lead to another form of authoritarianism. The case of Burma illustrates that mili-
tary dominance can be sustained even after the military formally retreats from power. The 
ongoing discussion in civil–military relations debates about the exact conceptualization of 
civilian control will shed further light on the diverse roles militaries play in diverse forms of 
authoritarian regimes.  
 
                                                 
24  This, however, is hardly surprising, since the regional norm in Southeast Asia is – with some notable excep-
tions – electoral authoritarianism (Bünte/Croissant 2011). 
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